Some Abuses of Antitrust Prosecution: The Investment Bankers Case by Carson, Ralph M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 3 
1956 
Some Abuses of Antitrust Prosecution: The Investment Bankers 
Case 
Ralph M. Carson 
Member, New York Bar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the 
Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph M. Carson, Some Abuses of Antitrust Prosecution: The Investment Bankers Case, 54 MICH. L. REV. 
363 (1956). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1956] INVESTMENT BANKERS CASE 363 
SOME ABUSES OF ANTITRUST PROSECUTION: 
THE INVESTMENT BANKERS CASE 
Ralph M. Carson* 
THE epochal decision of Judge Medina on October 14, 1953, in United States v. Morgan1 has already been the subject of 
adverse criticism by the losing Government counsel and defense 
by an opposing lawyer.2 Professor Steffen's grief at the ruin of his 
handiwork has led him into the impropriety of attacking with 
unwarranted epithet a thoroughly considered decision by one of 
the most eminent judges now sitting in our federal courts and 
into the more symptomatic fault of attributing to the new chief 
of the Antitrust Division political motivation in his decision not 
to appeal.3 He has the assurance to assert that the appeal which 
was not taken must necessarily have resulted in victory for the 
Government. While not able in his articles to devote much time 
to the merits, he felt it "seems to be true" that the Government 
actually made out a prima facie case;4 but on more satisf~ctory 
technical points he is sure that "the case must necessarily have 
been reversed on appeal."5 
These technical points turn on a charge that the judge mis-
apprehended Professor Steffen's pleading of the conspiracy, that 
he mistakenly failed to discriminate between "terms" and "means" 
as pleaded, and that he gave too much emphasis to the need of a 
unifying element in the conduct of the 17 defendants charged. 
The nicety of verbal distinction thus attempted by the critic con-
• Member, New York Bar.-Ed. 
1 (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 621. 
2 Steffen, "The Investment Bankers' Case: Some Observations," 64 YALE L. J. 169 
(1954), and Steffen, "The Investment Bankers' Case: Observations in Rejoinder," 64 YALE 
L. J. 863 (1955); Whitney, "The Investment Bankers' Case-Including a Reply to Pro-
fessor Steffen,'' 64 YALE L. J. 319 (1955), and Whitney, "The Investment Bankers' Case: 
A Surrejoinder,'' 64 YALE L. J. 873 (1955). Professor Steffen drafted the complaint while 
at the Yale Law School (Trial Record 1796-1797, citing Bibliography of the Faculty in 
Dean's report, Sept. 1, 1948, p. 18), superintended the proceedings before the grand 
jury, and headed the Government staff for the civil case through the three years of pre-
trial proceedings and during the trial until June 29, 1951. 
The TRIAL REcoRD, running to 23,962 printed pages, is cited throughout this article 
as "Tr." followed by the page numbers of that record. 
s Adverted to by Mr. Whitney in 64 YALE L. J. 319 at 344, n. 70, with the references. 
Judge Barnes, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, explained 
to Congressman Celler's Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly Problems, May 13, 1955, that his decision with respect to appeal was a matter 
of judgment resting on the Supreme Court's respect for the determination of trial judges 
on issues of fact. Stenographic Minutes, pp. 525-527. 
4 64 YALE L. J. 169 at 193. 
IS Ibid.; repeated in 64 YALE L. J. 863 at 871. 
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trasts sharply with the inability of the judge and defense counsel 
to pin down the Government staff to definition during the trial. 
It is sufficiently dealt with in Mr. Whitney's articles; and one feels 
confident that the ordinary legal mind in reading the critic will 
have a sense of horror that the compliance of businessmen with 
the law is to be measured by these word-exercises of a Byzantine 
logothete, resembling nothing so much as the single and double 
procession of the Holy Ghost in Gibbon's 66th chapter.6 
But it may be doubted whether self-vindication is the prime 
object of the attack on Judge Medina. The probable end-result 
sought, consonant with a long endeavor on the part of certain 
academic circles, is to influence public opinion and particularly 
opinion in Congress. On May 13, 1955, Senator Douglas of 
Illinois, in testimony before Congressman Celler's Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly Problems, revealed his susceptibility 
to Professor Steffen's kind of writing in this way: 
"Now, I know that there has been a suit in the New York 
courts on this question as to whether the investment bankers 
were in restraint of trade. 
"The suit went on for a long time, and I was not able to 
follow it in very close detail, but I have read a very slashing 
article by Professor Steffen on the conduct of that trial, and 
it raised serious doubts in my mind as to whether the decision 
was based on the weight of the evidence. 
"The chairman [Geller]. And it is interesting to note, and 
I have not yet had an explanation-we may get it today-why 
an appeal was not taken from that decision. 
"Senator Douglas. I would be much interested in that 
myself .... 
"As I understand Professor Steffen's point it is that the 
judge-and he is undoubtedly a very honorable man-tried to 
break down every bit of evidence produced by the Attorney 
General, used analytical logic, so to speak, breaking up each 
part, saying that it by itself did not prove anything, and then 
said there was no proof, but refused to apply the principle 
of synthetic logic of seeing how the accumulation of specific 
6 "The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father alone, or from the Father and 
the Son, was an article of faith which had sunk much deeper into the minds of men; 
and in the sessions of Ferrara and Florence the Latin addition of filioque was subdivided 
into two questions, whether it were legal and whether it were orthodox. • • . It was 
agreed [in the Council of Florence] (I must entreat the attention of the reader) that the 
Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one principle and one sub-
stance; that he proceeds by the Son, being of the same nature and substance; and that 
he proceeds from the Father and the Son, by one spiration and production." 7 GmBoN, 
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF nm ROMAN EMPIRE, 114 and 117 (1909). 
1956] INVESTMENT BANKERS CASE 365 
factors, each one of which, perhaps, would not be determina-
tive in itself, would build up the case as a whole. 
"The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the judge in that 
case in my humble opinion, acted more like an attorney for 
the defendants than he did as a judge. 
"Senator Douglas. Well, that thought occurred to me at 
times, but I did not quite dare to say it, Congressman Celler."7 
This colloquy suggests it is time to set out the details in 
which the Investment Bankers case evidences the abuse of govern-
mental power both in the unwarranted election to prosecute and 
in the oppressive conduct of the prosecution. This is the more 
opportune as the recent Report of the Attorney General's National 
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws in its chapter on antitrust 
administration and enforcement says nothing about this central 
and basic evil in the law.8 
I. Pre-Complaint Proceedings 
In September 1945 the Antitrust Division served grand jury 
subpoenas for the production of documents relating to their 
financing on about 2,000 corporate and other business executives, 
according to news reports, 9 although Professor Steffen later told 
the court that only 125 companies were affected (Tr. 9062). The 
subpoenas were most comprehensive, dealing with all transactions 
in securities of $1,000,000 or more since January I, 1920. The 
prospective defendants and doubtless other investment bankers 
opened their files to FBI search without subpoena. By this process 
from 100,000 to 200,000 separate documents were accumulated 
in the Government files.10 In January 1944 the Antitrust Division 
had summoned to Washington H. L. Stuart of Halsey Stuart & Co., 
an investment banker who had been in the business since 1895 
(Tr. 13027), for questioning about a conspiracy among invest-
ment bankers (Tr. 14820). Stuart denied there was any con-
spiracy, but he or his associates over a period of years held with 
the Antitrust Division 100 conferences on the subject (Tr. 14823). 
Halsey Stuart & Co. were not defendants in the projected 
case. Counsel for some of the 17 investment bankers who were 
conferred with the Attorney General on the subject of his proposed 
7 Stenographic Minutes, pp. 486-4S8. 
s Report transmitted to the Attorney General, March 31, 1955, c. VIII. The case 
illustrates the soundness of the committee's conclusion that Sherman Act cases should 
be handled by the standard judicial process. 
9 NEW YORK liERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 19, 1945. 
10 Hearing of March 9, 1950, p. 26. 
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charges in March and October 1947. Convinced of the error of 
the course the Attorney General was following, five law firms sub-
mitted to him a memorandum on the general charges proposed and 
a separate memorandum on the agreement in restraint of trade in 
securities asserted to have been made in conferences called by the 
New York State Superintendent of Insurance in 1941-1942. Counsel 
for the Investment Bankers Association, also charged by the 
attorney general as a lobbying organization, submitted a separate 
memorandum. In these memoranda counsel for the various pro-
posed defendants laid out in general terms the facts about the 
business as ultimately found by the court six years later. It was 
pointed out, for example, that the 17 underwriters selected as 
defendants represented no recognizable line of demarcation, that 
they did not include some of the leading fi:r_ms, that they did not 
constitute a ranked list of leaders in the business either for any 
year or for any average period, that they are completely separate 
arid independent entities without cross-investments or common 
officers. Counsel for the Investment Bankers Association demon-
strated by the statistics of the organization that among the 716 
member firms the 17 proposed defendants played an inconsider-
able role either on the Board of Governors or on the leading com-
mittees. 
All this was to no avail. 
served October 30, 1947. 
' 
Professor Steffen's complaint was 
2. The Pleadings 
In terms seemingly precise the complaint accused the 17 under-
writer defendants of membership in an unlawful conspiracy since 
about 1915 to restrain and monopolize the securities business (par. 
43) by agreeing not to compete among themselves in the merchan-
dizing of security issues and to divide such merchandizing among 
-themselves on a mutually satisfactory basis by five specified means, 
to eliminate the competition of others by eight specified means, 
to diminish the use of competitive bidding and other financing by 
four specified means, to frustrate competitive bidding and circum-
vent regulatory orders therefor by four specified means, to con-
trol the management and financial activities of issuers by three 
specified means, etc. (par. 44). Among the means embraced in 
the terms of the conspiracy was recognition of the claims of tradi-
tional bankers, allocation of participations under the concept of 
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historical position, and exchange of participations on the basis 
of reciprocity. Various designated "predecessors" of the defend-
ants were described with the effect of bringing into the suit 
vanished underwriting houses such as J. P. Morgan & Co., the 
original Kidder Peabody & Co., Chase Securities Corporation, 
Harris Forbes & Co., Harris Trust & Savings Bank, The National 
City Company of New York, and Guaranty Company of New 
York. Defendants and their predecessors were charged with 
having invented the modern syndicate method of distributing 
securities in 1915 (par. 27), and the insurance agreement, alleged 
to have arisen at meetings held at the invitation of the New York 
Superintendent of Insurance in 1941-1942 among representatives 
of some defendant underwriters and of six insurance companies, 
was set up as an act in the performance of the conspiracy (par. 
45C). Obedient to the source of complaint against the defendants, 
viz., unsuccessful competitors in Chicago and in Cleveland, the 
Government pleaders averred it to be a term of the conspiracy 
that the business of purchasing and distributing securities should 
be concentrated in a single market (viz., New York; par. 44A). 
Defendants interposed separate answers on March 17 and 18, 
1948 constituting a general denial. 
3. Pre-Trial Proceedings 
Judge Medina was designated on February 13, 1948 to preside 
at the trial and conduct all pre-trial procedures by the senior 
district judge on the application of the Government. He held 
extensive pre-trial hearings and made four separate pre-trial 
orders, of which Order No. 3 has particular significance. In the 
first order, made June 10, 1948 after three days of hearing, the 
court defined the conspiracy averred: 
" (1) That the conspiracy, restraint and monopoly 
charged in paragraph 43 of the complaint relate exclusively 
to matters alleged in paragraphs 44, 45 and 46 of the com-
plaint; that all the terms of the alleged continuing agreement 
and concert of action complained of are those enumerated 
specifically in Subdivisions A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H of 
paragraph 44; that all the acts and things relied upon to estab-
lish the forming and effectuating of the conspiracy are those 
specifically set forth in Subdivisions A, B, C, and D of para-
graph 45; and that no express agreement is relied upon to 
establish said alleged conspiracy or any part thereof, but only 
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a course of conduct from which the conspiracy may be implied 
or inferred. "11 
Order No. I also provided for a committee representing defendants 
to deal with plaintiff's demands for admission of the genuineness 
of documents, for the service of such demands upon defendants 
at 60-day intervals, and for 51 interrogatories to be answered by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories, served September 13, 
1948, followed the favorite procedure of swamping defendants 
with everything plaintiff had, without measure or discrimination. 
To the interrogatory requiring information about securities 
issues on which plaintiff would offer evidence at the trial, the 
Government listed 3,047 different issues extending back to 1899. 
To the interrogatory requiring the facts relied upon to show 
relationships giving certain defendants "domination and control" 
over the merchandizing of securities of certain issuers, the Govern-
ment furnished 135 printed pages describing 294· alleged instances 
in addition to numerous cross-references. To the interrogatory 
demanding occasions relied upon to establish plaintiff's claims 
regarding the traditional banker concept, plaintiff obligingly 
furnished 149 printed pages describing 313 instances in addition 
to numerous cross-references. To the interrogatory requiring the 
instances when defendants secured the appointment or election 
of a director, officer or member of protective committee of an 
issuer to promote the interests of defendants' underwriting busi-
ness (abandoned in part November 19, 1951, Tr. 10791), plain-
tiff furnished 150 described instances, with an appendix naming 
the directors, all of which·ran to 132 printed pages, in addition 
to extensive cros~-references. The interrogatory calling for a 
description of occasions where defendants used allied stockholders 
of issuers or financial institutions serving the needs of issuers to 
influence the underwriting business (abandoned in effect Novem-
ber 19, 1951, Tr. 10800-9) brought forth the equivalent of 47 
printed pages containing 54 alleged instances. The interrogatory 
requiring the identifying of occasions on which defendants in-
fluenced or controlled the affairs of issuers through relations of 
a commercial bank (greatly reduced by amendment, April 8, 
1952, Tr. 14742) brought a description of 96 instances running to 
11 Italics added. Notwithstanding Professor Steffen's recent attempted distinction be-
tween "terms" and "means" of the conspiracy, no protest from him against the second 
clause of this provision is of record in the case. 
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52 printed pages in addition to cross-references. To the in-
terrogatory requiring description of the occasions on which defend-
ants increased their security merchandizing business by promoting 
consolidations, mergers or the like ( abandoned after the openings, 
Pre-Trial Order No. 3, April 9, 1951; also November 19, 1951, 
Tr. 10790), plaintiff responded with the equivalent of 39 printed 
pages reciting 118 alleged instances, over and above cross-r~fer-
ences. The interrogatory demanding occasions when defendants 
formed buying groups in accordance with the concept of historical 
position brought forth 155 alleged instances occupying 63 printed 
pages in addition to three pages of cross-references. The inter-
rogatory requesting the occasions on which defendants formed 
stand-by accounts to bid at competitive bidding brought a response 
occupying 126 printed pages and including 182 alleged instances. 
In all, the 14 pounds of mimeographed paper which the 
Government tendered as its answers to the 51 interrogatories 
directed by Pre-Trial Order No. 1 ran to 1,899 printed pages 
occupying five ring binders. It was evident that the Government 
staff had thrown at the defendants everything they could scrape up, 
without selection or evaluation of any kind. The numerous in-
stances cited were either paraphrases from single documents in 
disregard of the over-all situation involved or biased one-sided 
versions from informers, later proved erroneous wherever tested. 
Subsequent developments showed that none of the Government 
staff knew which of their Niagara of documents would be actually 
relied on at the trial. Much less had any of them measured the 
probative force of the documents to be selected, either severally 
or collectively. 
By the time of the court's Pre-Trial Order No. 2, dated May 
25, 1950, 27 pre-trial hearings had been held on which 15 motions 
of major import had been argued and decided; 10,640 documents 
selected by plaintiff from its capacious reservoir had been pains-
takingly authenticated by the defendants and printed at joint 
expense; 21 depositions had been taken or provided to be taken by 
plaintiff; 22 extremely comprehensive demands by plaintiff for 
admission of the authenticity of documents had been dealt with; 
and the court was ready to fix the case for trial in October• 1950. 
Realizing the inadequacy of the statistical material on which plain-
tiff was proceeding, defendants had at their o·wn expense and 
by a system of questionnaires procured a comprehensive and 
exact statement as to all important security issues during the 
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15-year period 1935-1949 at a cost of $350,000, based on 36 volumes 
of issue data sheets each of 200 pages and 11 volumes of issue 
register lists.12 
The burden imposed on defendants and their attorneys was 
crushing. For illustration, plaintiff's request for admissions dated 
January 23, 1950 made a demand on all defend~nts for admission 
of matters which the committee described as follows: 
"The alleged facts appearing in a 17-page narrative state-
ment covering various details during the period 1929 to date 
concerning the organization and financing of The Lehman 
Corporation; trading accounts participated in by The Leh-
man Corporation; relationship between The Lehman Cor-
poration and Lehman Brothers; stockholdings of The Leh-
man Corporation in a number of corporations; transactions 
between The Lehman Corporation and other investment 
trusts; the organization and financing of General American 
Investors Co., Inc. and transactions between it and The Leh-
man Corporation; the organization and financing of Selected 
Industries, Inc.; the directorship personnel of Selected In-
dustries, Inc., trading accounts participated in by Selected 
Industries, Inc.; the stockholdings of Selected Industries, Inc. 
in a number of corporations; the formation of American In-
ternational Corporation; the personnel of the original direc-
torate of American International Corporation."13 
On the Government's application to force defendants other 
than that immediately involved to an admission with respect to 
this kind of demand, the Government's reasoning was disclosed: 
"Mr. Bennett: Now, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission before the passage of the Act regulating investment 
companies, which was passed I believe in 1940, held a long 
series of hearings on the subject and came out with a report 
which I would say is two feet across when you put all the 
volumes together. Now, we took the investment trusts or in-
-vestment companies which were controlled, as we understood _ 
it, or at least where there were connections with these defend-
ants. We went into this report of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and supplemented it by the information which 
we had marked for identification on the depositions.13a 
12 Memorandum on Pre-Trial Order No. 2, p. 10; United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 
1950) 10 F.R.D. 240. 
18 Report of Arthur H. Dean as Committee under Pre-Trial Order No. 1, March 1, 
1950, Appendix G, pp. 15-16. 
lSa Hearing of March 9, 1950, pp. 22-43. 
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"The Court: You see, we cannot argue everything in 
bulk. I would consider the first thing to persuade the Court 
about is where there is one defendant who had an investment 
company that he knew something about, an~ its investments 
and so on, how is it reasonable for me to compel or to take 
steps in the nature of a compulsion against defendants who 
concededly know nothing about that particular investment 
company? 
"Mr. Bennett: Your Honor, may I, just for the sake of 
the record, say that we do not concede that they do not know. 
We feel that they do know in most cases. 
"In other words, I say here we think with regard to a large 
part of these facts defendants other than Lehman Brothers, 
because of their familiarity and their participation in the 
syndicates, did have knowledge of the facts which we have 
alleged. "14 
"The Court: I think right this minute that these 
are utterly unreasonable demands. They are all discursive 
and almost argumentative. I do not see why you put them 
in, and I am not quite sure but that there is something to be 
said for the contention of the defendants that they are oppres-
sive. 
"Mr. Bennett: Your Honor, I thought I had explained 
to you that what we were trying to do was to boil down this 
case. These are the contentions we think are facts. 
"The Court: I know, but boil down the case by a great 
big, long-let us see how long this is. It is about ten pages, 
and it is the sort of thing a man might write as a brief. 
"It is just a long discursive statement. I just cannot see 
that. Let us get to this other point. Why should these other 
people admit that? Why should they come in and in effect 
say, 'Well, it is true we are all conspirators and all did this 
together, and although we really did not have anything to 
do with this particular phase, why, we admit it'? 
"This is an argumentative paragraph from beginning to 
end, and it doesn't seem to me that it is the function of an 
admissions procedure to get admissions of that character. But 
what we were talking about a moment ago is why should the 
other defendants who have had absolutely nothing to do with 
14 Hearing of March 30, 1950, p. 190. Italics added. 
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Tri-Continental, may never have heard of it at all that I 
know, why should they be forced to make admissions? 
"Mr. Bennett: Well, your Honor, may I ask you to tum 
the page and look at page 4 and you will see that Tri-Con-
tinental and Selected Industries, as has been admitted several 
times, are the co-owners of Union Securities Corporation, 
which is a defendant here. 
"I say there isn't any question-I don't think there is any 
question; I have heard it said time and time again by defend-
ants-that Tri-Continental and Selected Industries own Union 
Securities Corporation, which is a defendant here. 
"Now, if you will look at page 4, in the middle of the page, 
you will see that this Tri-Continental Corporation's co-owner 
of Union Securities Corporation, Selected Industries, Inc., 
was organized and underwritten by Charles D. Barney, which 
we claim is the predecessor of Smith, Barney; Stone & Web-
ster and Blodget, Inc., which is the other name for Stone & 
Webster Securities Corporation; Lehman Brothers, which is 
a defendant, Kidder, Peabody & Co., and Brown Brothers & 
Co., which we claim is a predecessor of Harriman Ripley & 
Co., Incorporated, the defendant Harriman Ripley & Co., In-
corporated. 
"So I say, your Honor, that these other people do have 
considerable knowledge. 
"The Court: Well, if you only think of one at a time, 
I mean you get on one and you get off and onto another one. 
There is one. Let's concentrate on that. That is simple. 
That is clear. Now, why should the other defendants be 
forced to admit or deny? That is what I would like to know. 
"Mr. Bennett: Your Honor, it is a public offering. These 
gentlemen are in the securities business and I certainly think 
they know when there is a public offering and who are in-
volved as underwriters. That is their business, your 
Honor."15 
This colloquy and many others that occurred in the 27 days 
of pre-trial hearings made it clear that Professor Steffen's staff 
were usirig their one to two hundred thousand documents and 
their 3,047 security issues as a reservoir from which to distil private 
conclusions conce,rning the securities business on the theory that 
the 17 investment bankers had a community of interest which 
15 Hearing of March 30, 1950, pp. 213-217. Italics added. 
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must be conspiratorial. Thus one of the staff, in explaining to 
the court why he could not stop with authenticating 8,000 docu-
ments but must have two or three thousand more, said: 
"For instance, we have documents that we must submit in 
regard to the community of interest that exists as a part of 
this conspiracy between the commercial banks and the invest-
ment bankers."16 
To explain why the Government had to print as "evidence" 250 
pages of affidavits of Robert R. Young filed in the 1938 injunction 
action of Alleghany Corporation v. Guaranty Trust Company,11 
Government counsel said: 
"Based on our investigation we feel that there is an existing 
monopoly and we have alleged it in the complaint .... Now 
we didn't make the monopoly. But there the monopoly is 
for us to prove .... In proving that monopoly we must 
create or build a structure that will show and demonstrate 
to your Honor that there is such a thing as a monopoly and 
a violation of the antitrust law. Now in building that struc-
ture it is going to take many timbers to build it. These 
documents are the timbers."18 
This conception of the conspiracy as a synthesis by the Govern-
ment staff from many thousands of disparate documents turned 
out in the development of the proof to be a correct description 
of the Government's case. 
Defendants' attempt to get disco·oery of documents. In the 
belief that the mass of papers procured by the Government at 
public expense and through the grand jury process should be 
equally available to the defendants for rebuttal of the claims based 
on them, the defendants from December 1948 on applied to the 
court for discovery. This was strenuously resisted. Every ground 
that the Government staff could think of-sovereign immunity, 
the privilege of informers, attorney's work-product (consisting 
in the "arrangement" of documents), Attorney General Murphy's 
Order No. 3229 of May 2, 1939 giving confidential character to 
Department of Justice files, etc.-was used to defeat discovery. 
The application was pressed by defendants in five separate hear-
ings over a period of 18 months, but met with successive denials 
due to the court's unwillingness to impede investigations. Upon 
a renewal of the application following the proceedings in United 
16 Hearing of March 9, 1950, p. 28. 
17 (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 203, affd. (2d Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 367. 
18 Hearing of April 20, 1950, p. 295. 
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States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee19 it was granted 
June 29, 1951, well after the commencement of plaintiff's evidence 
(Tr. 9073). The inspection which defendants were thus belatedly 
able to have of files collected by the Government from the Ches-
apeake & Ohio Railway Company, Halsey Stuart & Co., Otis & 
Co., and many others yielded numerous exhibits which attorneys 
for various defendants were able to use on cross-examination, 
although not felt by the Government staff to be relevant for their 
purposes.20 
In the meantime the authentication and printing of the 
Government's 10,640 documents continued. Included in the 
lot were 167 pages of excerpts from testimony given by Dillon 
Read representatives before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1942, 150 pages of excerpts from 1939-40 issues of 
the magazine Investment Banking, 119 pages of Securities and 
Exchange and Federal Trade Commission reports on Gulf States 
Utilities and other companies, 112 pages of excerpts from a pros-
pectus of Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and 112 pages 
of excerpts from a prospectus of Transcontinental Gas Pipeline 
Corporation.21 The expenses of this printing had run up to 
$120,000 by March 1950.22 
Pre-Trial Order No. 3 was not signed by the court until not 
only these procedures were completed but full openings of the 
case had been made by numerous counsel on both sides. By the 
time of the openings the Government staff had sufficiently revised 
their notions of the case so that, of the 10,640 documents which 
they insisted upon authenticating, they had elected only 4,000 
for tabulation in their outline of proposed proof provided for by 
Pre-Trial Order No. 2. Ultimately in its entire case plaintiff 
marked in evidence only 1,522 documents. Thus all the labor and 
expense upon the 9,118 documents printed, authenticated but not 
utilized, were wasted. Yet it is not open to a critic to assume that 
this grievous burden was imposed upon the devoted 17 out of 
governmental malice pure and simple. The explanation may 
again be that the Department of Justice presumed to prosecute 
19 (D.C. La. 1950) 9 F.R.D. 719, affd. by a divided Court, 339 U.S. 940, 70 S.Ct. 793 
(1950). 
20 An example among many is the pencil memorandum of William Wenneman made 
at the December l, 1938 Chesapeake &: Ohio finance committee meeting (Ex. MS-36, 
Tr. II677), which demonstrated that Messrs. Stanley and Walker did not put in a bid 
for the pending bond issue, contrary to the contention of the Government and its wit-
ness, Robert R. Young. 
21 Hearing of April 20, 1950, pp. 307-308. 
22 Hearing of March 23, 1950, p. 156. 
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without adequate information or knowledge. Professor Steffen's 
principal assistant said in the pre-trial hearing of March 9, 1950, 
in opposing defendants' suggestion of a split trial (p. 62): "The 
main reason is we think it is premature at th{s point. Nobody 
knows what our case is." 
4. The Openings 
Judge Medina said in the memorandum of April 9, 1951 
accompanying his Pre-Trial Order No. 3: 
"Had I permitted the usual brief and formal opening 
statements, I do not see how I could have exercised any 
intelligent control over the trial. In any event, I encouraged 
counsel for both sides to indulge in a very wide latitude in 
presenting their respective versions of the facts and the law. 
The first opening statement began on November 28, 1950. 
The openings in all consumed sixty-six (66) days of the time 
of the Court; fourteen (14) counsel were heard, three (3) on 
behalf of the plaintiff and eleven (11) on behalf of various 
defendants; in all the openings and various colloquies between 
the Court and counsel and between the various counsel made 
a record of some five thousand, four hundred fifty-three 
(5,453) pages."23 
This opportunity to open an equity case to an acute and atten-
tive judicial mind was one that alert counsel would embrace 
eagerly. At the outset, on November 8, 1950, the court made 
plain his purpose, viz., to get at once the clearest possible con-
ception of what the conspiracy was claimed to be: 
"The Court: I think there are going to be two things 
that I am going to be doing instinctively right from the 
beginning. One is . . . to be at all times alert to see 
whether the particular evidence is applicable only to one 
defendant or applicable generally to the others. And the 
other and perhaps more important thing that I am going 
to be alert to and all the time thinking about, is this idea of 
conspiracy, if there was a conspiracy. I must be thinking 
about that all the time, and I shall be. Whatever the out-
come of that thinking will be, I am certainly not going to 
wait until we get through a year of trying the case and then 
think whether there was a conspiracy. I am going to be think-
ing about that right from the drop of the hat every minute 
of the time that we are trying-this case."24 
23 (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 11 F.R.D. 445 at 453. 
24 Hearing of November 8, 1950, pp. 47-48. 
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Mr. Stebbins of the Government staff invited the judge to say that 
he did not want "an exhaustive opening that would re-cover all 
of this material." 
"The Court: I do not care how you do it as long as you 
get your side of the case into my head. That is what I want 
you to do from your opening. 
"Mr. Stebbins: I take it from what your Honor has 
said that you would like to have a real living thumbnail sketch 
of all of our claims and how we intend to prove them so that 
you will have a sort of a guide or a ruler, as it were, by which 
to evaluate our evidence as it comes along, without going 
into a mass of detail -
"The Court: You may have to go into the detail. I 
can't tell you any more than that except that you have got 
to try to get me to understand your case, and I do not care 
if you take a week in your opening or any other time, as long 
as you get it into my head. That is all I want. 
"Naturally, if you just come in and follow along with 
that brief, in a more or less formal and perfunctory way, 
that won't be doing me much good, because I can read it my-
self, although I do not guarantee to have that mass of docu-
ments all read before the opening begins, but I think it 
probably would be helpful to take some slightly different 
approach that would cut across that. But do it any way you 
want .... 
"The forthright way for all of us to proceed is going to 
be better for everybody concerned, and if somebody thinks 
that I am just not getting something, I don't mind at all if 
they get right up and say so. I want that kind of talk. 
"Mr. Stebbins: That is very gratifying to know, your 
Honor."25 
An independent reason which made extensive opening state-
ments a matter of elementary fairness to the defendants is that at 
the commencement of the trial Government counsel handed up 
to the court four thick and misleading volumes, viz., a Trial Brief 
Part I (Summary and Analysis of Facts) comprising 458 pages; a 
Trial Brief Part II (The Applicable Law) comprising 81 pages; 
an Appendix B, Part I-Traditional Banker Charts of 609 pages; 
and an Appendix B, Part II-Historical Position Charts comprising 
143 pages. As far as the facts of the case were concerned, these 
25 Id. at 48-49. 
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were stuffed with distortion and plain mistake.26 In the openings 
of defense counsel, the validity of all these bulky books as to their 
version of the facts was thoroughly riddled; and that is the real 
reason for Professor Steffen's present criticism of the opening 
statements.27 He, as well as his associates, Mr. Stebbins and Mr. 
Baldridge, had made openings to the court. While Mr. Baldridge 
at one point criticized the speeches of counsel for their length, he 
at another point praised the practice (Tr. 4427); and Mr. Steffen 
himself in delivering a rebuttal on April 2, 1951 said: 
"Now, as your Honor knows, I came into these proceed-
ings only about the middle of March, and I probably am not 
qualified to say much about these opening statements to 
your Honor. I assume they have been useful. While they 
have been much longer than any the Antitrust Division has 
had any part in heretofore, I hope they have proved to be 
valuable to the Court." (Tr. 5435) 
It was not until after Judge Medina had signed his Pre-Trial 
Order No. 3 that Professor Steffen made formal objection to the 
length of the opening statements (Tr. 5584). The following 
colloquy then occurred (Tr. 5585): 
"The Court: Do you think it is fair to wait until the 
opening statements are concluded and then object to the 
fact that they have taken place? 
"Mr. Steffen: I think that there were objections in the 
course of the opening statements. 
"The Court: How long a continuance do you desire in 
order to obviate this alleged error? 
"Mr. Steffen: I do not want any. I am prepared to go 
right ahead with the evidence. . . . 
"The Court: That objection is overruled and you are 
given an exception." 
The real difficulty with the opening statements of counsel 
from plaintiff's point of view is one which cannot be avowed, 
viz., that they demonstrated conclusively that the Government 
lawyers did not know what they were talking about. It was made 
apparent that the "case" was nothing but a selection of phrases 
26 Illustrations: (a) Plaintiff inflated the percentage of negotiated underwritings 
attributed to the management of defendants by counting in full issues co-managed by 
non-defendants. (b) In listing the participants in underwriting groups to show "his-
torical position" plaintiff systematically omitted non-defendants, whose presence would 
have shown the innocence of the practice. 
27 64 YALE L. J. at 193-194 and 871 (1954). 
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from an enormous medley of documents having no internal 
relationship and evidencing no concert among the defendants; 
worse, that Government counsel could not answer questions about 
these documents. It was made apparent too that the Government 
counsel could not explain how the 17 defendants and no others 
were constituted conspirators by means of practices which all other 
investment bankers followed, that . the Government's statistics 
about underwriting were basically erroneous, that Government 
counsel did not know the real meaning of the claim of successor-
ship inserted in the complaint. When asked by the court which 
issuers the Government claimed the defendants controlled and 
which they did not, Mr. Baldridge could not answer (Tr. 1998): 
"Mr. Baldridge: Well, that is something that will be 
unfolded. 
"The Court: We can think about that? 
"Mr. Baldridge: That is something that will come out 
in the evidence." 
When asked whether the Government claimed Morgan Stanley 
& Co. to be the ringleader of the conspiracy, Mr. Baldridge said 
(Tr. 1977): "No, not up to this time"; and again: "I don't care 
to answer that just now." 
Professor Steffen on the other hand did attempt in his opening 
statement to go into the evidence on some points and did so 
with disastrous effect upon his claim about the so-called Pink agree-
ment. In 189 pages of exposition (Tr. 4921-5008, 5017-5117) of 
the Government's case on this transaction, he specified what an 
officer of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 
would testify- (Tr. 5033) and promised further oral evidence 
(Tr. 5025): "We have members of the insurance group who took 
notes and will testify rather clearly. We have a banker who 
may testify." The fact that, when the time came for proof, Govern-
ment counsel ran away from this promise and refused to tender 
any witnesses whatever despite the earnest request of the court 
(Tr. 18914) makes extended opening statements as objectionable 
to ~n irresponsible prosecution as they are helpful for ascertain-
ment of the truth. 
5. Pre-Trial Order No. 3 
Another reason why on April 26, 1951 the chief of the Govern-
ment trial staff registered for the first time formal objection to 
the extensiveness of the opening statements is that they had led 
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the court, on April 9, 1951, to the formulation of his Pre-Trial 
Order No. 3, establishing a procedure for the receipt of evidence 
of conspiracy and imposing upon the plaintiff an obligation of 
disclosure which forever destroyed the possibility of the Govern-
ment's fastening upon the defendants a synthetic conspiracy from 
disparate phrases in a miscellany of documents. Pre-Trial Order 
No. 3 is a procedural device of the first importance to a fair, orderly 
and responsible presentation of a conspiracy claim. It was pro-
tested against by the Government staff as soon as signed. 
This order granted the application of the Government, made 
as a result of examining its proof in the light of the opening state-
ments, to amend the complaint by (a) dropping three items of 
claim, (b) curtailing the proof on five other items, and (c) amend-
ing the description of the conspiracy. It also dealt with the at- · 
tempted addition of 850 additional documents in the outline of 
proof. To curb the Government's tendency to beg the question 
by lumping all 17 investment bankers together in every statement 
the order required specification as follows: 
"C (2) To avoid confusion, delay and unnecessary dis-
cussion counsel for plaintiff are hereby directed to refer to 
the 'defendants', 'they' meaning the· defendants, and 'the 
defendant banking group' only when reference is intended 
to each and every defendant acting jointly; wherever refer-
ence is made to two or more defendants or defendant firms, 
but not all, the names and identity of such defendants or 
defendant firms shall be specified."28 
The order also made·detailed prescriptions about the handling 
of evidence, recording of objections, etc., and fixed April 30, 1951 
to begin the taking of evidence. But the salient clause was the 
provision putting on the Government the responsibility for con-
necting the evidence in support of its conspiracy claim, as follows: 
"B (1) Proof, documentary and otherwise, which is ad-
missible against some or all of defendants only in the event 
that a prima facie showing is made of combination, agree-
ment or conspiracy in accordance with the requirements of 
controlling precedents, will be received subject to connection 
and motion to strike, upon condition that at the close of 
plaintiff's case and prior to the making of motions to dismiss 
and argument thereon counsel for plaintiff shall state to the 
Court in detail and with appropriate references to testi-
mony and exhibits: (a) the proofs which it is claimed make 
28 United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 11 F.R.D. 445 at 451. 
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out a prima facie case of such combination, agreement or 
conspiracy against all or some of defendants 'aliunde', that 
is to say independently of the items received as above stated 
subject to connection and motion to strike; and (b) such 
further discussion of the evidence as a whole as will fully 
disclose the theory of plaintiff's case and the contentions made 
relative to what it is claimed has been established prima facie 
against each defendant. Because of the complicated nature 
of the case this is deemed essential in the interests of justice 
as a preliminary to the making of motions to dismiss and 
argument thereon. "29 
Provision was made for marking of exhibits received against all 
defendants (thus presumably constituting evidence aliunde of 
the alleged conspiracy) and separate marking of those received 
against one defendant only and not to be used against others until 
the prima facie showing of conspiracy had been made: 
" (f) Exhibits shall be marked as follows: 
~• (i) Those received generally against all defendant firms, 
by the symbol 1-A and so on, followed by the printed pre-
trial number. For example: Exhibit 1-A (477). 
" (ii) Those received subject to connection and motion• 
to strike, by the symbol 2-B and so on, followed by the initials 
of the defendant firm or firms (if any) against whom the 
exhibit is received generally and by the printed pre-trial 
number. For example: Exhibit 2-B (M S & Co.) (1522). 
" (iii) Each of the defendants' exhibits shall be marked 
with the initials of the defendant firm offering the exhibit, 
followed by a number in sequence .... For example: 
Exhibit KL-1 (5843)"30 
After the completion of the Government's proof and before 
i~s connecting statement preliminary to defendants' motion to dis-
miss, Pre-Trial Order No. 3 was on December 9, 1952 amended 
so as to restate the foregoing provision and add the following: 
" (b) . The order of presentation by counsel for plaintiff 
shall be first to state, with appropriate references to testimony, 
exhibits and other data which are part of the record, the 
contentions made relative to what it is claimed has been 
established prima facie against each defendant seriatim, com-
pleting such statement with respect to one defendant before 
proceeding to another, in order that the Court may be able, 
without excessive labor and within reasonable limits of time, 
29 Id. at 449. Italics added. 
ao Id. at 450. 
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to assess and evaluate such contentions and claims and the 
testimony, exhibits and data referred to. After all such state-
ments shall have been completed, counsel for plaintiff shall 
demonstrate to the extent deemed necessary any similarities 
or conformities asserted to exist between the proofs with 
respect to different defendants, and put the parts of the so-
called mosaic together, by presenting plaintiff's case as an 
integral whole." 
It was these procedural provisions for the regulation and 
scrutiny of the Government's proof, based on the fundamentals 
of the law of conspiracy, which by preventing confusion and com-
pelling clarity of statement brought about a self-demonstration of 
the emptiness and artificiality of the Government's case. Judge 
Medina explained Pre-Trial Order No. 3 with a memorandum on 
April 9, 1951.31 The discussion in this memorandum of the 
court's search for the unifying elements of the alleged conspiracy 
has attracted criticism from Professor Steffen.32 But a reading 
will show that the judge was merely emphasizing for the Govern-
ment's benefit the degree of proof necessary to show a conspiracy: 
"It is obviously my duty to keep the defendants in mind 
as separate entities until the plaintiff sustains the burden 
of proving the alleged combination and conspiracy. 
"Because of the situation which I have just described I 
have hit upon an expedient, described in the annexed Pre-
Trial Order No. 3 which will in no way hamper the plaintiff 
in the introduction of its evidence, but will serve to clarify 
the state of the proof before I hear and determine the motions 
to dismiss. 
"Declarations of alleged co-conspirators made in further-
ance of the objects of the alleged conspiracy will be received 
subject to connection and subject to a motion to strike. At 
the conclusion of the government's case-in-chief, argument 
on the motion to strike will. be heard and at that time the bur-
den will be upon the government to show a prima facie case 
of combination as alleged against each defendant from evi-
dence 'aliunde.' 
"I have adopted this procedure because of the unusually 
complicated and involved factual issues presented, because 
of the scope of the charges, because of the number of de-
fendants and because of the absence of any readily apparent 
31 Id. at 452. 
32 64 YALE L. J. 169 at 175. 
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or explicable 'unifying element' or elements whereby the 
alleged co-conspirators may be brought together into a unit. 
This apparent absence of what I have called a 'unifying 
element' makes the factual issue of conspiracy or agreement 
one of the most crucial and complex in the case, and dis-
tinguishes this case, insofar as problems of proof are con-
cerned, from every other anti-trust case which has been 
brought to my attention."33 
6. The Trial April 30, 1951 to 
May 19, 1953 
This enormous period of time was occupied by the plaintiff's 
leisurely presentation of documents, the examination and cross-
examination of four witnesses tendered by plaintiff, and plaintiff's 
connecting statement pursuant to Pre-Trial Order No. 3. These 
operations illustrate on a great scale the defects of the Govern-
ment's antitrust techniques. 
(a) Fragmentation of Proof. As was recognized by Pre-
Trial Order No. l,34 the Government based its conspiracy charge 
upon no express agreement but upon inference from 'a course of 
conduct. This was sought to be collected from a multitude of 
syndicate agreements, each embracing one or more defendants 
(or asserted predecessors of defendants) and a number of non-
defendants; from 4J express agreements on various matters, each 
embracing one or several (but less than all) defendants; and from 
a multitude of phrases in miscellaneous documents created in a 
great variety of transactions, with non-defendants and non-con-
spirators participating. The Government had an elaborate out-
line of proof, annexed to Pre-Trial Order No. 3, pursuant to 
which the authenticated documents were classified. 
The Government's procedure was to have eight lawyers by 
rotation present this proof, section by section according to the out-
line and defendant by defendant in order, by reading in the stip-
ulated captions of the documents and also reading selected scraps 
from the 21 depositions. Apart from some attempt to trace the 
security issues of a few companies consecutively, there was no con-
nection or sequence of any kind in the presentation. The alleged 
restrictive practices of the several defendants were sought to be 
proved by emphasis on isolated phrases in documents chargeable 
33 United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 11 F.R.D. 445 at 454-455. 
34 June 10, 1948, quoted at note 11 above. 
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to each, without any attention to whether or not the entire trans-
action from which the document emanated was competitive in 
character. The Government's lawyers, in other words, bent their 
gaze exclusively on selected verbiage.35 ' They sought to create 
the conspiracy by establishing a similarity of phrase between the 
documents or the deposition testimony of one defendant and the 
documents or deposition testimony of another, without regard to 
the nature of the underlying transactions; indeed, frequently in 
disregard of the competition inherent therein. Worse, the eight 
Goverment lawyers were each unacquainted (by and large) with 
the segments of the proof tendered by the others and could not 
respond to the court's questions about the relationship among 
them. 
Thus, a nine-page document containing diary entries of Smith, 
Barney & Co. (Ex. 189-B [SB] [3333]) was introduced by the 
Government, Mr. Steffen said, "simply to show that E. B. Smith 
& Co. in their initial approach to the case said they had to go to 
Morgan Stanley" (Tr. 8364). The document, however, showed 
that Morgan Stanley did not get the Panhandle Eastern financing 
involved, but that successive issues went to different groups of 
investment bankers, including two non-defendants (Tr. 8362). 
It showed that the new president of Panhandle Eastern in Novem-
ber 1936 felt the financing was still open to the house submitting 
the best proposition (Tr. 8363). The court asked for information 
about this president but Mr. Steffen did not know (Tr. 8365). 
Again, after putting in evidence a letter by First Boston Corpora-
tion to Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation dated September 
4, 1936 (Ex. 342-B [FB] [315]) stating that First Boston would 
not bid on capital issues, the Government attorney had to admit 
that within a few weeks First Boston headed an underwriting 
syndicate for the company addressed. The court naturally said 
(Tr. 9482): "So I am puzzled as to what you want me to infer 
from this." 
The Government's explanation was (Tr. 9483): 
"Mr. Buttle: Only that that was their point of view. 
. . . They say they are opposed to bidding for it. . . . I say 
as a matter of fact in many of these cases where we have docu-
mentation if you develop it further you will find that there is 
35 Production of a file of defendant Blyth & Co. containing 1937 correspondence with 
National Gypsum Company showed that the FBI investigators had looked only for docu-
ments containing selected phrases, omitting all others, with the effect of misrepresenting 
the nature of the transaction. Tr. 8889-8891, June 30, 1951. 
384 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
competition. . The point is simply this, your Honor, 
that I am certainly not going to make an jssue of this par-. 
ticular document." (Italics added.) 
The comment drawn from the court was of a kind repeated 
throughout the trial (Tr. 9483): 
"Well, it is the sort of thing that various lawyers for one 
or another of the defendants told me in the very beginning 
was going to happen-that you would get documents with 
some little word or phrase in there that seemed helpful, and 
then barge ahead, utterly forgetful of the fact when you come 
to understand it as a whole it showed just the opposite. I 
don't see why you keep doing it." 
This was fair warning. But the process of shredding the proof 
by words and phrases continued inevitably because the Govern-
ment lawyers knew nothing else. In the plaintiff's final connect-
ing statement the Government attorney, describing the alleged 
agreement of defendants with the insurance companies as a result 
of superintendent Pink's conferences, could not answer the court's 
question whether defendant White, Weld & Co. had anything to 
do with it (Tr. 18914-5): 
"Mr. Bennett: I haven't gone into that proposition. 
"The Court: All right. 
"Mr. Bennett: Because I haven't thought it was desir-
able to do it at this time, but I will be very happy to do it if 
your Honor requires. 
"The Court: That is a tricky way of looking at this. 
You are supposed now to be showing me the case you have 
against each of these defendants, and if you just stand there 
and just touch on one or two little things . . . - you ought 
not to do that. 
"I have waited all this time for this mosaic to be built up 
to see what the Government has, and I don't like this pick-
ing and choosing. . . ." 
· The record is full of this kind of thing. The Government 
counsel charged with the case (Professor Steffen left the staff in 
June 1951) had no course but to keep on as they were doing be-
cause the case bequeathed them allowed nothing else. Mr. Bald-
ridge had confessed in the opening that the Government took no 
account of competition that failed to obtain the business (Tr. 
4758). 
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(b) Avoidance of Live Witnesses. For the most part the 
Government were chary of witnesses. They did produce two 
minor ones and two of major importance. The latter were Robert 
R. Young and Harold L. Stuart. Each exploded the Govern-
ment's claim in a different way, and when Stuart left the stand 
after a prolonged cross-examination the Government took no more 
chances with witnesses. 
Young was called because of his record of antagonism to J. P. 
Morgan & Co. and his controversy over public sealed bidding with 
Morgan Stanley & Co., the former dating from his struggle to get 
control of Alleghany Corporation in 1938. Much of his testi-
mony revolved about his campaign to impose upon railroad com-
panies a method of financing at public sealed bidding, over the 
resistance of managements who preferred to negotiate their 
security issues with underwriters of their own choice. The resist-
ance to compulsory sealed bidding by Morgan Stanley & Co., Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. and others was made an article of charge by the 
Government on the puerile ground that, since "competitive bid-
ding" includes competition, those opposed to it (as an undesir-
able mode of financing) had thereby ranged themselves against 
all competition; and on the Gilbertian thesis that the similarity 
of attitude in this respect on the part of defendant and nondefend-
ant investment bankers indicated a combination among def end-
ants. A great deal of the testimony, not really germane to the 
conspiracy issue in the case, dealt with the circumstances in which 
Young procured the sale of the Chesapeake & Ohio $30,000,000 
bond issue of December 1938 to Halsey, Stuart & Co. and Otis 
& Co., with the misstatements then made as to the defendants 
Morgan Stanley and Kuhn, Loeb having put in a "bid" for the 
issue (in reality they had not, and Professor Steffen now says it 
doesn't matter3°) and with a continuing campaign of partisan 
publicity by Young and others through a series of ten security 
issues concerning the original Chesapeake & Ohio transaction.37 
This campaign resulted in the imposition of compulsory competi-
3B 64 YALE L. J. 169 at 189, n. 97 (1953). 
87 Otis &: Co., who as investment bankers had not received the participations they 
desired in underwritings headed by defendants, carried on this campaign with Young, 
Cyrus Eaton of that firm maintaining close communication with President Roosevelt 
(Ex. KL-12, MS-150A) for the purpose of bringing pressure on the administrative agen-
cies. Senator Truman, in a Senate speech Jan. 15, 1940, was induced to espouse the 
Young-Eaton version of the Chesapeake &: Ohio transaction [86 CoNG. REc. 328 (1940)], 
of course without any knowledge of the circumstances. 
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tive bidding on the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in 1941, and on certain utility companies by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in 1944. 
But the important thing about Young's testimony despite his 
obvious bias against certain defendants, was that he, as president 
of Alleghany Corporation, found no difficulty in getting bids on 
a proposed issue from various defendants (Tr. 11622, 11933, 
12119). The conspiracy alleged by the Government did not seem 
to be operating during the time of Young's financial negotiations 
in 1938 and 1944. Moreover, although insistent upon imposing 
compulsory sealed bidding on others, Young selected for Alleghany 
Corporation the negotiated method of financing, because advised 
by Stuart that he could get a better price thereby (Tr. 11911, 
11937, 12118). 
Stuart's testimony was even more destructive of the Govern-
ment's theories. Called as a witness because he had adopted the 
competitive bidding approach as a means of getting business after 
the Insull collapse had destroyed the large business he theretofore 
enjoyed on the negotiated basis,38 Stuart in his extensive testi-
mony on cross-examination showed conclusively that every fi-
nancial method and syndicate device which the Government had 
charged against defendants as showing a conspiracy among them 
was widely practiced by Halsey, Stuart & Co. and other admitted 
non-conspirators. As a result Government counsel abandoned the 
charge of the complaint that defendants had invented the syndi-
cate method (Tr. 13986). 
After these experiences the Government called no more wit-
nesses, preferring to rely on isolated phrases from a scattering of 
documents selected out of many thousands. None of the defend-
ants was called to the stand, although selections were read from 
their depositions. The court's repeated requests for a witness to 
clarify a point (Tr. 10278, 14757, 14761) were disregarded. At 
Tr. 18914 the court said: 
"I don't understand how, when you charge that Pink 
agreement implicating all the people that you did implicate 
in that charge, then you start making the proof and when I 
begin complaining and say I want a witness, I want one of the 
people who were there, I want to hear about this, you say 
38 Acting as investment banker of Samuel Insull, Stuart did not propose public sealed 
bidding for Insull company securities "because we had the business" (Tr. 13751). 
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Yes, your Honor, we will give you a witness, and then putting 
it off day after day, and then all of a sudden somebody comes 
in and says, Your Honor, we are going to rest; we will let 
the Pink agreement stand on what is in the record. Now that 
is stopping just as you get to the point where you were going 
to have a witness who would tell me what was agreed upon." 
The court had signed a subpoena for Donald C. Slichter of North-
western Mutual Life Insurance Company (Tr. 10929-30). Gov-
ernment counsel often promised to produce him to testify about 
the alleged Pink agreement (Tr. 12764, 12770, 12993-4), but on 
his failure to appear Government counsel claimed not to know 
that his testimony would have been favorable to the defense 
(Tr. 19236). 
(c) Evasive Presentation of Conspiracy. Most striking was 
the changeable and devious presentation of the alleged conspiracy. 
As pleaded in the complaint it was a definite and tight combina-
tion resting on deference to the so-called traditional banker, allot-
ment of participations on the basis of historical position, and the 
reciprocation of business among the defendants. But the very 
opening statements showed that the continuity of relationships 
on which the Government depended did not really exist, and this 
was conceded by Government counsel (Tr. 4755). Although 
described in the complaint as a term used by defendants (par. 22), 
"traditional banker" appears to have been originated by counsel for 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the TNEC inquiry 
(Tr. 8475), not by defendants; and finally, Government counsel 
claimed that it did not matter whether defendants used the term 
or not (Tr. 20700). The self-defeating nature of the concept was 
shown by the concession that, if the traditional banker was in a 
shaky position, defendants "would go in . . . and compete for the 
business" (Tr. 8025). Where an issuer came to a defendant, said 
Mr. Steffen (Tr. 8448), "we have never contended that they would 
not take the business in such circumstances." 
What the Government concession ultimately boiled down to 
was that defendants would compete for business where they sepa-
rately judged that another investment banker did not have a 
"satisfactory relationship" 1,vith the issuer (Tr. 7847). It was 
sought to build a tissue of similar phraseology among defendants 
by asking a half dozen out of the 17 whether they would go after 
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business of an issuer whose relationship with another investment 
banker was "satisfactory." The answers varied, and there were 
actual instances of defendants competing in disregard of an 
apparently satisfactory relationship with another investment 
banker. 
The Government staff shamelessly manipulated the word 
"satisfactory" to create the appearance of conspiratorial action by 
certain defendants, just because it is a word of elastic meaning and 
furnishes an automatic escape in respect of any competition which 
might tum up. Such competition would not under this concept 
have availed defendants because it would show the prior relation-
ship by defendants not to have been "satisfactory." The semantic 
device was based on circular reasoning, as one defendant pointed 
out.39 But in this way Mr. Steffen was enabled to reconcile with 
his theories the startling competitive fact. of Morgan Stanley's 
taking away the Dominion of Canada financing from First Bos-
ton in 1936 (Tr. 8583): "Whether or not there was a satisfactory 
relation or the Dominion itself felt there was a satisfactory relation-
ship with the first Boston is simply a matter of conjecture at this 
time."40 
This flight from the original charge was enough in itself to 
dispose of the case, since it was conceded that the case must stand 
or .fall on the "traditional banker" claim (Tr. 10433). But 
Government counsel also asserted that the traditional banker 
evidence did not in itself prove the conspiracy (Tr. 9345, 9481), 
and referred to the claims about historical position and reciprocity. 
Yet on examination of all the Government's evidence on these 
points; they also disappeared. It was formally conceded that 
participations in underwriting groups are accorded for purely 
business reasons (Tr. 1835, 20753) and that claims to under-
writing participations on the basis of so-called historical position 
were also made by non-conspirators (Tr. 10432, 10719) and did 
not violate the Sherman Act (Tr. 10521). Cyrus Eaton and H. L. 
Stuart, not charged by the Government as conspirators, asserted 
rights to underwriting participations on the basis of historical 
position (Exs. MS-92, MS-76, Bl-65; Tr. 10592-3, 16088). The 
39 Harold Stanley at Tr. 8418: "That is what I meant to say, because if he is satis-
factory how can anybody else get it?" 
40 This was June 20, 1951. In its connecting statement Jan. 21, 1953, the Government 
took the same line (Tr. 19269-71). 
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third element of the alleged conspiracy, reciprocity in the exchange 
of business, was said by Government counsel in their opening to be 
general among the defendants (Tr. 135), but in the proof the 
keeping of any records even remotely reflecting reciprocity was 
shown as to only nine of the 17 defendants (Tr. 10768). As finally 
formulated the charge of reciprocity was nothing more than the 
use of records of past mutual business to get future business, and 
was admitted to be merely neutral and not illegal (Tr. 10830, 
10834, 10957, 11148). 
The break-up of the Government's paper case of matched 
phrases is nowhere better illustrated than in the original descrip-
tion of the conspiracy as starting with the Anglo-French Loan of 
1915. This was the position taken in the Government's answers 
to interrogatories served in 1948, being based in part on a state-
ment of Mr. George Whitney (whose association with J. P. Mor-
gan & Co. ran back to 1916) in the TNEC inquiry in 1939. In 
pre-trial proceedings the Government expressed an intention to 
call Mr. Whitney as a witness;41 but the notice of taking of his 
deposition, which they gave in April 1949, wa,s withdrawn on the 
eve of his testimony, doubtless to. prevent its being available to 
defendants in the presentation of plaintiff's case. During the trial, 
when requested by the defense to call Mr. Whitney as a witness 
on a point in issue, the Government staff declined to do so (Tr. 
12940-2). The Anglo-French Loan of 1915 remained for a time 
the inception of the supposed conspiracy (Tr. 6581), was then the 
subject of equivocation by Mr. Steffen (Tr. 6590), was treated by 
the court as still in the case at the end of plaintiff's proof (Tr. 
18916), but was in effect abandoned during its connecting state-
ment (Tr. 19282). 
In shaping and re-shaping their diminishing claim of con-
spiracy, the Government lawyers successively jettisoned timber 
after timber of the ideal construction originally envisaged.42 The 
justification and propriety of various defendants' fight against the 
imposition. of compulsory competitive bidding by administrative 
agencies was conceded (Tr. 11817-8, 11887, 15497), and yet their 
simil_arity of attitude in that respect was made an article in the 
accusation of conspiracy even though investors, issuers and other 
41 Hearing of December 7, 1948, p. 76. 
42 Page 373 supra. 
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investment bankers not conspirators opposed compulsory sealed 
bidding for the same reason (Tr. 12388, 12376). Sinister allusions 
to a "gravy train," employed by Government counsel in their open-
ing (Tr. 273), were finally agreed to be out of the case (Tr. 19109). 
And so was the claim that defendants controlled issuing com-
panies (Tr. 9492, 12126). The charge as to placing representatives 
of defendants on boards of directors of issuers was conceded not to 
be a term of the conspiracy (Tr. 10010, 10017, 11538), although 
claimed to be a means of preserving the conspiracy (Tr. 10017-8), 
whatever that means. On November 19, 1951 the Government 
voluntarily dismissed the case as to the Investment Bankers Asso-
ciation (Tr. 10775), thus vindicating the representations made in 
vain by its counsel to the Attorney General four years before. The 
symptomatic claim as to concentration of the investment banking 
business in a single market was quietly abandoned at the same 
time (Tr. 10790). 
Yet in a blind and dogged way the Juggernaut rolled on. At 
the very end of the case Government counsel came to the decision 
(after long hesitation43) to name Morgan Stanley as the "master 
mind" or "leader" of the ass·erted conspiracy (Tr. 19354-5), 
although conceding that they had "no specific, direct evidence 
against Morgan Stanley & Co. in connection with any specific 
issue" (Tr. 19250). The whole thing, so far as they were con-
cerned, was sheer surmise based on business pre-eminence (Tr. 
19251, 19260). Government counsel found not a thing wrong 
with Morgan Stanley getting a lot of utility financing (Tr. 19297). 
With respect to the charge of price maintenance in syndicate 
agreements, the evidence conclusively showed that Morgan Stanley 
had abandoned all provisions to that effect in 1938, and plaintiff 
declared their position in this regard to be unique (Tr. 19409). 
This ultimate decision of the Government strategists to accuse as 
the head of the conspiracy just that underwriting firm which was 
conspicuous in conducting its business on the merits, which was 
among the most successful, and which had been the most deter-
mined in defending the liberty of corporate management against 
compulsory. sealed bidding, was the consummate touch that 
reduced the case to hash. 
43 Page 378 supra. 
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( d) Phraseology and Semantics. The Government case 
abounded in misuse of the semantic values of words. Examples 
are the treatment of "competitive bidding" and "satisfactory," 
discussed above. And necessarily out of the voluminous documen-
tation available the Government staff were able to draw scattered 
phrases that suggested some restrictive practice. These they 
generalized without scruple, against the evidence. An example 
is the term "proprietary interests," which appeared in a memoran-
dum of September 30, 1920, prepared in the Boston office of the 
old Kidder Peabody & Co. in relation to percentage participations 
of New England sub-underwriters in American Telephone and 
Telegraph financing (Ex. 859-B 466). One of the Government's 
four witnesses, J. R. Chapin, testified that this phrase was used 
only in the Boston office of the old Kidder Peabody and referred· 
only to New England participations in American Telephone 
financing alone (Tr. 12816-7, 12874). Chapin was competent to 
speak, having been since 1910 an employee and during 1928-31 a 
partner in the old firm which went into liquidation in 1931. Yet 
the word "proprietary" is taken up into the complaint (par. 
45A[ 4]) as denoting a general restrictive practice agreed among 
all defendants.44 
A second example is the memorandum of July 27, 1935 in 
which a Kuhn Loeb partner recorded himself as saying that his 
firm "did not want to poach on their [Edward B. Smith & Co.'s] 
preserves" (Ex. 117-B [KL] 135). This too is taken up into the 
complaint as a term of agreement among all defendants (par. 
45A[l]) embodying a general "ethic not to compete." Yet the 
evidence before Judge Medina, adduced by the Government 
itself, showed in the clearest way that the 1935 financing of Arm-
strong Cork Company, which this memorandum concerned, at-
tracted competition among four of the defendants, including 
Kuhn Loeb & Co. The phrase about poaching on preserves was 
44 In this Professor Steffen may have followed others. Such a use occurred in the 
Public Utility Division report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Dec. 18, 1940, 
which influenced the commission to adopt Rule U-50 imposing compulsory sealed bidding 
for certain utility securities. Another occurred in a student note written on the com-
petitive bidding controversy in 50 YALE L. J. 1071, n. 20 (1941). Both were quite erroneous, 
as shown by the evidence before Judge Medina. Both were based on the partisan and 
one-sided proceedings of the Temporary National Economic Committee. The latter and 
the Public Utility Division Report as well, together with other writing of this kind, 
have managed to introduce error into a leading text like DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY 
OF CoRPORATIONS, 5th ed., 1953. See volume 2 at pp. 1043, 1044, n. 7. 
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addressed by the Kuhn Loeb partner to a would-be "finder" in 
an effort to have this agent bring an Armstrong Cork senior 
executive into the Kuhn Loeb office, as part of their campaign to 
get management of the financing. 
These and the other verbal tags used by the Government are 
exhaustively discussed in the court's able opinion in their con-
text which usually shows competition. In an ocean of documents 
such scattered phrases can always be found. They were not 
honestly appraised by the prosecution. 
(e) Misleading Presentation. The Antitrust Division in-
creased the burden on the court because of their handling of the 
case in the way described, by a method of presentation which in 
many points was positively misleading. Thus counsel system-
atically employed the word "caretaker" in the description of 1935 
railroad financing of issuers formerly clients of J. P. Morgan & 
Co., in order to insinuate an understanding that Morgan Stanley 
would later take over the business, although admittedly-15 no 
such word appeared in the evidence. Again, in 31 court days of 
oral summation and in 526 pages of closing briefs, plaintiff made 
virtually no mention of examples of competition shown in scores 
by various defendants in derogation of the Government theory. 
Another illustration was counsel's garbling of the defendant 
Stanley's statement, "There is also competition between investment 
bankers seeking new clients" (Ex. 192-B [MS] 925) by omitting 
the word "also" · in order to argue a concession by Stanley that 
competition existed only at that point (Closing Brief, Part I, p. 43; 
see Tr. 22286-90). Perhaps worst of all was the statement (Closing 
Brief, Part I, p. 3) that Part II ". . . will demonstrate that a 
showing of conspiracy has been made by a preponderance of the 
evidence" (italics added) followed by a discussion confined to 
scraps of evidence that contained the Government's key words 
or phrases and remaining silent on the great mass of countervailing 
evidence. This was on the pretext that all evidence in the plain-
tiff's case that did not support the plaintiff's theories was "evidence 
relating solely to matters of defense" (Closing Brief, Part II, p. 
1)-a shabby device indeed and one which r<1;n flatly contrary to 
45 Letter of July 16, 1953 from Richard B. O'Donnell, Chief, New York office of the 
Antitrust Division, to Ralph M. Carson. 
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the court's ruling on the precise point at the close of plaintiff's 
case and was conceded by Government counsel themselves to be 
erroneous (Tr. 18648-50). 
Of a piece with this last device was the conduct of the attorneys 
of the Antitrust Division, throughout their so-called connecting 
statement of 31 court days, in ignoring sedulously and persistently 
every scrap of evidence favorable to the defendants. Their con-
necting statement thus became an anthology of phrases, useless to 
the court except as a demonstration that the issues would be 
evaded by the plaintiff to the very end. The opportunity to use 
Senator Douglas's "synthetic logic" was vigorously rejected by 
every Government lawyer. 
(£) Alleged Price Maintenance. The complaint alleged that 
defendants unlawfully maintained prices through their under-
writing agreements. A bundle of 1,143 separate agreements used 
in 505 separate underwritings was put in evidence by Government 
counsel as Exhibit 41-A (Tr. 6388). The charge based on this 
exhibit was leveled as an inseparable part of the general conspiracy 
which Government counsel said would not be changed (Tr. 
1526-7); but at the end of the case an application was made by 
them to amend the complaint so as to set up price maintenance 
through syndicate agreements as a separate and independent 
conspiracy (Tr. 15671-9). This change of heart was due to the 
fact that the Government's witness, H. L. Stuart, not asserted to 
be a participant in the general conspiracy, employed price main-
tenance clauses and thought them indispensable (Tr. 14043, 
14312-4, 14432). 
The motion to amend, although favored by most of the defend-
ants, was properly denied by the court because of the confusion 
that it would unavoidably engender, on the enormous record 
before him.46 The court's discussion of the price-fixing charge 
in the syndicate system,47 although labeled as by way of dictum48 
in view of his :findings on the charge of conspiracy, has great value. 
In concluding that the fixed-price type of public offering of new 
securities gives no offense to the Sherman Act, the court ranged 
46 United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) IIS F. Supp. 621 at 685-686; Tr. 
20904-6. 
47 IIS F. Supp. 621 at 683-699. 
48 Id. at 686. 
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itself with the administrative agency charged by Congress to over-
see the securities market. Ever since 1945 the Securities and Ex-
change Commission had been in disagreement with the views 
on the subject of the Antitrust Division, and the complaint in the 
Investment Bankers case was filed with knowledge by its -authors 
of the adverse opinion on the price-fixing charge which the com-
mission recorded in the Public Service Company of Indiana case.49 
7. Consent Decree and Politics 
The accumulating enormous expense to which these dilatory 
and wasteful procedures put the defendants (who were not like the 
Antitrust Division able to draw from a bottomless purse furnished 
by the taxpayers including the defendants) rendered consent 
decree a continually pleasing mirage. It is the habit of the Anti-
trust Division to keep this possibility before the eyes of prospec-
tive defendants. The present assistant attorney general in charge 
of the division points out the advantage of a consent decree in 
removing the danger of treble damage suits. He also observes: 
"Consent settlements may, in addition, cut down the peptic ulcer 
rate among corporate executives by avoiding the publicity of a 
protracted public trial. . . . In some instances, this publicity, 
largely avoidable in a consent settlement, may prove as damaging 
as the remedy decreed."50 
In so massive and costly a case as this, the prospective victims 
necessarily considered whether a negotiated decree was feasible, 
i.e., one in which the defendants should be bound in the future 
not to commit unlawful acts which they denied they were com-
mitting in the present. But it was quickly made plain that no 
such alternative was open. The terms of peace included provisions 
directed to render impossible the manner in which the under-
writing business was being currently conducted by the proposed 
defendants while leaving free all other underwriters who operated 
in the same manner. 
Litigation was inevitable. But in the conduct of the litigation 
the wasteful and oppressive methods above outlined kept constant 
pressure on. defendants to surrender their economic liberty so 
49 Exchange Act Release No. 3700, June 13, 1945. 
50 Hon. Stanley N. Barnes, in UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUsr LAWS (Practicing Law 
Institute) 135 (1955). 
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as to arrest the financial drain upon them. These methods 
approximated the procedural pattern which one finds in Franz 
Kafka's The Trial. 
Now that the litigation has ended upon terms which cast such 
serious doubt (to say the least) upon the justification of the suit 
originally, the attempted return of the controversy to a congres-
sional committee is worth a moment's attention. As with many 
ambitious antitrust suits, this one had an origin in partisan politics. 
The record carries many references to presidents, senators, com-
missioners with whom unsuccessful competitors of one or another 
defendant lodged charges as colorful as inaccurate. The com-
plaint, when filed, was employed for partisan purposes. A Demo-
cratic presidential contender treated it as "evidence" for purposes 
of a speech in the Senate.'11 The Attorney General cited it 
liberally in an address November 15, 1949 to the American Finance 
Conference in Chicago, to show how the Administration was work-
ing to protect small business from the effects of the alleged con-
spiracy. He told his auditors "The case is set for an early trial." 
The case not being set for trial at all, the defendants on March 9, 
1950 applied to have it set down for April 3, only to meet with 
the objection that the Government would not be ready until some 
3000 more documents were authenticated.52 
Now much of the elaborate documentation which so confused 
the Government staff and befogged the record came from the 
congressional investigations that have dealt with financial practices 
at frequent intervals in the past 40 years. Indeed the doctrine 
embodied in the complaint can be traced to the successful polemic 
of Louis D. Brandeis, in 1914, entitled Other People's Money, 
which in turn was based on hearings conducted in 1912-13 by 
the Pujo Subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency, 62d Congress, 3d Session.53 In this and in the many 
subsequent investigations by congressional committees alone, wit-
nesses were denied the protection of counsel, and the endeavors 
lil 96 CONG. REc. 8017 Uune I, 1950). 
52 Hearing of March 9, 1950, p. 34. 
li3 Telford Taylor points out that counsel to this committee, the late Samuel Unter-
myer, dominated it completely. TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 63 (1955). In part 25 of the 
proceedings (pp. 1831-2) is an interesting example of how this resolute examiner directed 
H. P. Davison away from his proposition that J. P. Morgan &: Co. frequently acted to 
strengthen its competitors. 
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of the committee staff to base a thesis on a one-sided presentation 
were not controlled by any corrective evidence or by cross-examina-
tion. Hence much misinformation and misdirected legislation.54 
Judge Medina's masterful and comprehensive opinion marks 
the :first occasion in the financial history of this country in which 
conclusions as to the conduct of the securities business as such have 
been based upon observance of the customary judicial guarantees 
of fairness and accuracy, viz., cross-examination, confrontation of 
witnesses, the hearsay rule. It sets a standard which both con-
gressional investigative staffs and the Antitrust Division might 
well use as a corrective to the long process of systematic misinfor-
mation that led up to the filing of the complaint. 
8. Some Conclusions 
A. The Investment Bankers case was a bold attempt to put 
into effect unfounded doctrinaire views as to how the public issue 
business should be conducted, by subjecting the defendants to 
punishing labor and expense as the alternative to an acceptance 
by them of the unjustified restrictions of a negotiated decree 
which would have brought about permanent regulation of the 
industry through the Antitrust Division. 
B. The abuse of the conspiracy concept which the prosecu-
tion employed can be effectively checked by the differential 
marking of exhibits and the requirement of a final connecting 
statement by plaintiff, which Judge Medina provided in his Pre-
Trial Order No. 3. This procedure is an essential aid to justice 
in a conspiracy case of any size. 
C. The attempted flooding of court and defendants with 
documentary material is still a favored practice of antitrust staffs55 
which justifies two remedies. One is the imposition upon plaintiff of 
54 Former President' Truman in his current volume of memoirs points out that his 
vote in the Senate in favor of the disastrous Neutrality Act of 1937 was due to his being 
misled by the report of the munitions investigation conducted by Senator Nye. TRUMAN, 
YEAR OF DECISIONS 153, 189-190 (1955). The political value of the Nye-Clark investigation 
at the time is that it also was an attack upon J.P. Morgan&: Co. for their activity as fiscal 
agents of the Allies in this country in 1915-16. 
55 In the United Shoe Machinery case, Judge Wyzanski's order of March 10, 1950 
complained of 4600 exhibits comprising hundreds of thousands of pages as to which, 
said the court: "It is plain from the Government's brief, from the fact that no single 
Government counsel in the more than two years that this case has been pending has read 
more than a fraction of the exhibits, and from the magnitude of the task that the 
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the cut-off date suggested by United States v. Oregon State Medical 
Society56 and related rules of procedure elaborated in the Judicial 
Conference Report,57 in the American Bar Association Commit-
tee's report on practice and procedure in the trial of antitrust cases 
(1954), and in Chapter VIII, section 5 of the Report of the Attor-
ney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 
(1955). A second reform badly needed is statutory provision for 
recovery by the successful defendants from the Government of 
their costs of defense. 
D. The Investment Bankers case and some others indicate 
that the greatest need in antitrust prosecution is a higher profes-
sional standard of responsibility and decision in both the selection 
of cases and the presentation of evidence. The only hope of cut-
ting these conspiracy cases down to size, said Judge Medina, "lies 
in the exercise of a sound discretion by the Department of J us-
tice. "58 At various points in the trial he called attention to the 
oppressive effect of the protracted, pointless accumulation of docu-
ments in combination with plaintiff's continued unwillingness 
to take a position, abandon a hopeless contention or clarify its 
theory of proof (Tr. 9055, 12990, 12994, 18912, 18914). He felt 
that such procedure, if followed in even a few cases, would lead 
to a breakdown in the administration of justice in this country.59 
Those who participated in the case felt that neither the Attorney 
General nor his assistant in charge of the Antitrust Division ( of 
whom there were three during the pendency of the· case) exer-
cised any effective control over it. There was no flow of command 
from the top to the staff, apart from a few months' appearance 
in the case of the Chief of Civil Litigation for the Division follow-
ing the earnest remonstrance of · one of the defendants' attorneys 
to the assistant attorney general in charge. 
The effect of the administrative break-down in the Depart-
ment of Justice evidenced by the Investment Bankers case is to put 
Government does not expect this or any other Court even to look at- not to say study-
all or even a large part of these exhibits." See further Judge Wyzanski's description in 
the final opinion of the "unforgivably unselective tactics pursued by the Government" 
in that case. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 
295 at 314, alfd. 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954). 
56 343 U. S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952). 
57 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). 
58 118 F. Supp. 621 at 827. 
59 Hearing of April 13, 1950, p. 242. 
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in the hands of the trial staff letters of marque and reprisal against 
legitimate business, valid for the duration of the voyage, without 
check or direction from the supposed masters of policy. The en-
tire body of antitrust law suffers in repute from these abuses in the 
machinery of enforcement. 
